This paper has been published under the same title as a chapter in the book "Basilea, la crisis financiera y la institucionalidad regulatoria en Chile: propuestas de reformas" (Basel, the financial crisis and regulatory institutionality in Chile: proposals for reforms) (
Basel III in Chile: Advantages, Disadvantages and Challenges for Implementing the New Bank Capital Standard Even though a growing number of emerging countries are implementing the Basel III recommendations on bank capital, this is not yet the case in Chile, a financially sound economy that has not undergone a banking crisis since the 1980s. This paper analyzes the relevance, advantages and challenges that the Chilean financial system would face if the new international standard were implemented. One conclusion is that there are two substantial reasons to implement Basel III: (a) the need to avoid major regulatory discrepancies between domestic and foreign banks, considering that the parent companies of European banks operating in Chile are already implementing Basel III, and (b) the need for tools, such as the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer, to prevent credit booms. A second conclusion, based on simulation exercises, is that if Basel III were implemented, Chilean banks at an aggregate level would comply with the Basel III recommendations regarding total capital ratios, but would have a moderate capital deficit to comply with the Tier I Capital Ratio (which includes only higher quality capital). This leads to the recommendation for a more detailed analysis at the level of individual banks. A third conclusion is the need for gradual implementation of the new standard, in the current context of a less favorable international environment affecting Chile and other emerging countries in the short and medium term. Finally, further analysis is recommended to determine which Basel III recommendations should be adapted (rather than adopted) to the Chilean context. One example is that it would not be appropriate to use the reference indicator suggested by Basel III (deviations of the credit/GDP ratio from its trend) in order to activate (or deactivate) the countercyclical capital buffer since it could lead to an increased pro-cyclicality of capital requirements -precisely the opposite of what Basel III intends.
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I. Introduction
One of the main lessons learned from the 2008 international financial crisis is the need to strengthen the regulatory framework governing the operation of banks and other financial institutions. Although the reasons behind the 2008 crisis are multiple and even debatable, there is agreement on the role of regulatory and supervisory shortcomings in generating the global crisis. Within this context, in December 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a body in charge of designing and proposing international standards to increase the soundness of the banking system, made a series of recommendations which were compiled in the document entitled Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. The recommendations on bank capital are a central component of the new regulatory framework proposed in Basel III. 1 These recommendations make major changes to the capital standard established in Pillar I of Basel II (proposed by the BCBS in 2004 and enacted in many countries during the international financial crisis). 2 The number of countries undergoing the process of incorporating Basel III recommendations is increasing. For example, in July 2013, United States' Federal Reserve approved a new regulation on capital requirements in line with Basel III. Furthermore, the new European Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) is already in force and includes even stricter regulatory requirements than Basel III. Finally, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru are some Latin American countries that are making progress in implementing the new regulatory capital standard.
Capital requirements in Chilean regulation currently follow Basel I recommendations (although the Central Bank of Chile has issued supplementary regulations which include some aspects of Basel II and III). Full implementation of Basel III would require amendments to the General Law of Banks. Within this context, the aim of this document is to analyze the relevance, advantages and challenges that the Chilean financial system would face upon implementing the Basel III recommendations on capital.
The rest of the document is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of the analytical grounds supporting the new Basel III recommendations on capital. Section III examines whether the regulatory change involved in implementing Basel III is relevant in Chile, a country which, unlike many other Latin American countries and developed countries affected during the international financial crisis, has not undergone a banking crisis for over three decades. Section IV identifies the potential advantages and disadvantages adopting Basel III guidelines would pose to the strength and competitiveness of the Chilean financial system. Section V analyzes the challenges that Chilean banks and their supervisors would face if the new capital standard were implemented. It presents a numerical exercise which endeavors to answer the question: Is Chilean banking capable of complying relatively easily with the Basel III minimum capital requirements or would it have to increase its capital holdings significantly to comply with the new regulation? Section VI discusses the dilemma of adopting versus adapting Basel III through a quantitative analysis of one of Basel's specific recommendations: the countercyclical capital buffer. Section VII presents the conclusions.
II. Basel III: A Macroprudential Approach to Regulation
The analytical framework underpinning the Basel III recommendations is based on the acknowledgment that a microprudential approach to regulation (according to which banks must correctly evaluate the risks in their individual portfolios) is not sufficient to guarantee financial system stability. Under the microprudential approach, the regulatory framework evaluates indicators which reflect each bank's financial strength separately. Capitalization is a core indicator and, following the Basel I and II recommendations, it is measured by the capital/risk-weighted assets ratio. The contribution of the macroprudential approach is in trying to minimize the macroeconomic costs of severe problems in the financial system. In particular, it aims to prevent credit busts from emerging on a systemic level due to problems in the banking system, as this would in turn lead to contraction in economic growth.
As described in Borio (2009) , the macroprudential approach has two dimensions: (a) a crosssectional dimension across banks resulting from common risk exposures among banks (whether they are directly exposed to the same asset classes or to interconnectedness) and (b) a temporal dimension resulting from the evolution of risk during the business cycle. This second dimension is explained by the fact that during good times, when the economy has sound growth rates, risks tend to be perceived as low. This gives incentive for excessive credit expansion, which can debilitate the financial system when the business cycle reverses and economic activity slows down. During the slowdown period, the credit portfolio tends to deteriorate and banks tend to limit credit expansion, which in turn reinforces economic slowdown. This is why bank credit is said to be pro-cyclical.
How do Basel III recommendations on capital relate to the macroprudential approach? They do so in three ways as discussed below. 3 First, under the new regulatory standard, great emphasis is placed on capital quality, not just on capital quantity. Basel III defines better quality capital (called Common Equity Tier I Capital) as consisting common shares and accumulated reserves as these are assets with the greatest capacity to absorb unexpected losses. In contrast to Basel II and its long list of assets qualifying as Tier I Capital (which proved ineffective in absorbing losses during recent financial crises in developed countries), Basel III is very strict in the definition of assets that qualify for this category. The emphasis on capital quality is entirely consistent with the macroprudential approach because, by recommending that most capital be maintained in high quality assets, it minimizes the likelihood of systemic banking crises (and the consequent credit contraction at the aggregate level) and the fiscal cost of resolving them (when they cannot be avoided).
Second, in addition to the recommendations for improving capital quality and quantity, Basel III proposes reforms for counterparty risk hedging, including those related to exposure for operations with derivative instruments. For this purpose, Basel III recommends implementing a metric called Expected Positive Exposure, which enables improved measurement and manages counterparty credit risk better by using stressed parameters. These recommendations are in line with the cross-sectional dimension of the macroprudential approach.
Third, Basel III recommends adopting a capital component that evolves over the business cycle. This component, called the countercyclical capital buffer, is a capital surcharge added in recognition that during major financial disturbances, demand for bank shares drops dramatically. In other words, although improvements in defining which assets are considered high quality capital reduce the likelihood of severe credit contraction during bad times, these improvements may not be enough to prevent these credit contractions entirely. Thus, following a macroprudential approach, Basel III recommends accumulating additional capital during good times (beyond the minimum needed to maintain adequate banking operations in absence of adverse shocks) to absorb expected losses during bad times.
The following is a summary of Basel III capital requirements: 
Source: BIS
In line with the above discussion, even if the minimum capital requirement is still 8%, Basel III introduces two major innovations to Basel II. The first is that two new buffers are added: the conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer, which can be used during periods of financial stress. The second is that it recommends that most regulatory capital should be maintained as Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (7% out of 10.5% of total capital, excluding the countercyclical buffer). Both recommendations are fully aligned with the macroprudential approach to banking regulation.
III. Is It Relevant to Apply Basel III in Chile?
The Chilean banking sector is one of the most highly developed and deepest in Latin America. As shown in Table 2 , its credit-to-GDP and deposits-to-GDP ratios are much higher than the Latin American average, comparable only to Brazil. Moreover, after Costa Rica, it is the country in the region whose credit-to-GDP ratio has undergone the highest continuous growth (22 percentage points) since the 1990s. recently concluded that the Chilean supervisory system is sound. 4 Although there are some major areas that need reinforcement (such as independence and legal protection of regulators, and consolidated supervision), Chile meets most of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 5 In particular, its accounting, auditing and financial information reporting systems follow international standards; the rules on provisions for expected losses on bank loans are considered to be of very high standard and bank rating is based on a riskbased supervision framework. Furthermore, in 2013 the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, SBIF) introduced new rules to improve corporate governance practices at its supervised institutions.
It is important to highlight that Chilean authorities have begun analyzing/implementing Basel III recommendations on liquidity indicators. These recommendations are complementary to the recommendations on capital. As discussed in Section II, both sets of recommendations are based on a macroprudential approach to financial regulation and supervision, and are thus based on similar principles. However, it is also important to note that the current process of public consultation about proposed Chilean regulations regarding liquidity indicators could identify major challenges for certain banking segments. The challenges identified will need to be considered by the authorities before the regulations are finalized and will provide important lessons to take into account if it is decided to implement the Basel III recommendations on regulatory capital. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section V.
Regarding the macroeconomic position, even though Chile's growth projections have declined for 2014-15 compared to previous periods, partly due to the deterioration in the terms of trade as a result of the drop in copper prices, it is undeniable that Chile (along with Peru and Colombia) has one of the best economic fundamentals among Latin American countries. One way to reach this conclusion is by answering the question: In the event of a negative external shock (e.g. an increase in US interest rates), would Chilean authorities be able to implement countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies to minimize the impact of the shock without generating economic and/or financial instability? The answer is yes, due to (a) low levels of foreign debt (in relation to GDP); (b) large accumulation of international reserves combined with high exchange-rate flexibility capable of absorbing external shocks; (c) low inflation rates, consistent with the Central Bank's strong credibility in maintaining inflation targets; and (d) a fiscal position which remains strong. 6 Indeed, recent reductions in the interest rate by the Central Bank show the implementation of a countercyclical monetary policy. 7
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Chile is also very well positioned with regard to institutional quality, especially that which directly affects the financial system. A couple of examples will help support this statement. First, regarding judicial independence, the World Economic Forum indicators show not only that Chile is the most highly rated Latin American country but also that the characteristics of its judicial system place it at the same level as many developed countries. Second, the World Bank's Doing Business indicators show that Chile is in a position equal to or better than the average OECD country regarding its ability to protect investors' rights and guarantee contract compliance. 8
Chile's international financial integration creates strong incentives for
harmonizing the regulations governing the parent companies of foreign banks with the regulations governing domestic banks.
The participation of foreign banks in Chile is significantly important (more than half the banks are foreign-owned). These banks are primarily from European countries, particularly Spain. The Spanish banking system is already implementing Basel III recommendations for regulatory capital because they have been included in the new European Commission Directive, established in 2013, governing bank capital regulation in Europe (Capital Requirements Directive IV-CRD IV). 9 This new regulation is expected to be applied strictly in Europe, not only due to the history of regulatory failures which gave rise to the European financial crisis, but also because of the creation of the banking union, through which the European Central Bank will play a central role in banking supervision. In addition to European banks, foreign banking in Chile includes countries such as Canada and Brazil, which are in the process of adopting Basel III.
In this context, the regulators of parent companies of foreign banks operating in Chile might require their overseas subsidiaries to comply with Basel III capital requirements. 10 In the particular case of Chile, this would imply that foreign banks operating in Chile would have to comply not only with Chilean regulatory and supervisory requirements but also with the foreign requirements. This would lead to major differences between domestic and foreign banking, the effects of which would not be perceived during "good times" when the proportion of non-performing loans is very low, the value of shares in the banking sector are high (and rising) and it would therefore not be a problem to comply with capitalization ratios above those required by Chilean regulation. But during times of financial difficulty, such as those produced by an adverse external shock, the effects of the regulatory differences would emerge. On the one hand, since foreign banking in Chile would have to satisfy higher capital requirements (as required by the parent company, not the Chilean regulator) than domestic banks, foreign banks would find themselves at a disadvantage compared to domestic banks.
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On the other hand, precisely because of maintaining more capital, foreign banking would find itself in a stronger position than domestic banking in facing adverse shocks. In either case, the situation would create distortions in competitiveness between domestic and foreign banking. It is therefore relevant to consider harmonizing banking capital regulations in Chile and the home countries of these foreign banks. The Basel III recommendations are a starting point.
Credit cycles are marked in Chile
As discussed in Section II, the aim of Basel III countercyclical capital is to minimize the macroeconomic costs of financial disturbances, preventing credit bubbles in "good times" and credit busts which severely affect economic growth in "bad times." Thus, to analyze whether or not to implement the regulation on countercyclical capital in Chile, it is important to determine the characteristics of the country's credit cycle, and answer two questions: (a) Have there been any recent credit booms in Chile which led to strong contraction in growth of real credit when they ended? and (b) Are there similarities between the characteristics of credit cycles in Chile and those in other Latin American countries, some of which are already in the process of implementing Basel III recommendations?
This document uses the methodology developed by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) to identify periods of credit booms in Chile and other countries in Latin America, 11 which separates real credit behavior into its trend component and cyclical component. A credit boom is identified as an episode in which real credit exceeds its long-term trend by a value greater than a certain threshold. 12 When a credit boom is identified, its duration is defined as the time during which real credit exceeds its long-term trend. The trend and cyclical components are identified using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Graph 1 shows the dynamics of real credit in Chile. The measurement of real credit that we use is calculated as the stock of bank credit to the non-financial private sector 13 deflated by consumer price index. The data were provided by the Central Bank of Chile and monthly series, from January 1991 to December 2013, were used. The red line indicates the cyclical component of credit, with values greater than zero indicating that real credit is higher than the trend. The dotted green line shows the threshold value established (see footnote 13).
This methodology shows two credit boom episodes in Chile during the whole period, which are marked by the shaded areas on the graph. The first boom occurred in the second half of the 1990s, around the East Asian crisis, beginning in September 1996 and ending in May 
Cyclical component Threshold
Graph 2A: Characterization of credit booms in selected Latin American countries
Source: Central banks of selected countries, IFS
Graph 2B: Credit booms in selected Latin American countries
Source: Central banks of selected countries, IFS
Other similarities and differences between Chile and the two groups considered can be identified in terms of the duration of the boom. Graph 2B shows the average duration of the expansion and contraction phases. Chile differs from other countries in the sample because the expansion phase (from the start to the peak of the boom) was significantly longer (9.7 quarters or 29 months) than the contraction (from the peak to the end of the boom) (3.7 quarters or 11 months).
The information in the above paragraphs can be summarized in two statements. First, evidence shows the presence of credit booms in Chile in recent decades; and second, these booms were similar to those in some regional countries (Group 1, identified above). It is interesting to note that Peru and Colombia, two of the countries most like Chile in the dynamics of their credit booms, have already implemented countercyclical regulations. In The discussion in Sections III.1 to III.3 shows that it is relevant for Chile to consider implementing Basel III international capital standards.
IV. Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Applying Basel III in Chile
While the previous section concludes that it is relevant to consider the Basel III recommendations in Chile, this section discusses the potential advantages and disadvantages in proceeding with these recommendations. The criterion used in this discussion focuses on the effects of adopting the Basel III guidelines on the strength and competitiveness of the Chilean financial system.
Potential Advantages
The discussion in preceding sections largely points to a series of potential advantages for the Chilean financial system by implementing Basel III recommendations on capital. Given the high level of financial openness in Chile (reflected in limited cross-border capital controls) and high level of integration of the Chilean banking system to international financial markets, some of the most important advantages of implementing Basel III are directly related to (a) the ability of Chilean banking to maintain international competitiveness and (b) the strength of Chilean banks to face possible external and internal shocks. These two points are discussed below.
a. Improved Competitiveness for the Chilean Banking System
The extent to which the international standards proposed by the Basel Committee are met is becoming increasingly important to both international investors' evaluation of the strength of local financial systems and to the scores awarded by risk rating agencies to the instruments issued by financial institutions. In other words, compliance with Basel III recommendations is being recognized internationally as a sign of financial strength. In particular, compliance with recommendations on minimum regulatory capital has become a sign of banking solvency.
Aware of these developments, several Latin American countries have begun implementing the new capital standard. Particularly outstanding are Brazil and Mexico, the two largest countries in the region, whose regulators have expressly stated the intention of improving the international competitiveness of their financial systems. 17 They are both members of the Basel Committee and a recent Committee report declared them to be in full compliance with the standard. 18 Colombia, which, as mentioned in the previous section, has credit cycles similar to those in Chile, has also formally begun implementing Basel III, and Peru has adapted (as we shall discuss below) the Basel III countercyclical capital recommendation to its national context. 19 In the context in which these two Latin American countries, which are simultaneously partners and competitors of Chilean banks, are rapidly modifying their legislation to implement the new capital standard, it is considered advantageous that Chile does the same.
For a clearer idea of the progress made in this area by some regional countries, recommendations. 20 The differences are greater in Colombia, especially because it has not yet included the conservation buffer (although the subject is on the supervisory authorities'working plan). None of the three countries in the sample has incorporated the countercyclical buffer in its legislation.
The implementation schedule proposed by Basel III, and those established by Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are as follows: . 21, 22 According to the degree of financial depth in Latin America, only Chile can compete with Brazil as a regional financial center. Although this subject is not on the short-term regulatory agenda in either country (especially in the current context of sub-regional integration of Pacific Alliance countries), this discussion cannot be ruled out for the future and constitutes an additional incentive for Chile to comply with international bank capital standards.
b. Greater soundness for the Chilean financial system
The core of a banking system's soundness includes the capacity of banks to manage risks created by their role as financial intermediaries. The minimum capital requirements recommended in Basel III are a management tool. However, the nature of these requirements is unconditional to the business and credit cycle, i.e., minimum capital does not vary over time according to changes in the systemic risks a financial institution may face. This is why, as explained in Section II, Basel III also includes countercyclical capital, which requires accumulation of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (up to 2.5% as a percentage of the 20 The Brazilian case is interesting. During the debates prior to implementing Basel III there was great concern regarding the effects on bank capitalization of deducing deferred tax assets (DTA) from the regulatory capital (a Basel III recommendation). However, in coordination with the Basel Committee, it was agreed that it was not necessary (or prudent) to deduct the DTA component related to time differences caused by the provisions for loans with problems, because these assets (credits) do not depend on the bank's future profitability and can therefore be counted as assets capable of absorbing unexpected losses. This is an example of the room for discretion allowed by the regulators when implementing Basel III recommendations. 21 Mexico's speed is particularly outstanding because there was no transition period. 22 The reduction in minimum total capital requirements in Brazil (from 11% in 2013 to 8% in 2019) is due to the fact that under the new standard, banks would have to implement a series of deductions to calculate regulatory capital. In other words, according to the Basel III criteria, the 2013 11% capital ratio was highly overvalued. Under that circumstance, the Central Bank of Brazil decided to set the minimum capital requirement at the level set by Basel III: 8%. This has already been approved by the Basel Committee. RWA) during periods in which the supervising authority considers credit growth excessive and potentially leading to an accumulation of systemic risk.
To date, only Peru has included rules about a countercyclical capital buffer in the spirit of Basel III (though with major differences, see Section VI). In view of the analysis presented in Section III with regard to the characteristics of Chilean credit cycles, it is beneficial for Chile to implement the countercyclical capital buffer. As mentioned above, Chile's high level of integration with international financial markets makes it susceptible to sudden changes in the risk perception of international investors. For example, a rapid and steep increase in the US interest rates (beyond what is expected by markets) could create a major reversal of capital flows in emerging countries and Chile in particular, raising the costs of external financing and generating major pressure on economic growth and the quality of banks' credit portfolio. In that context, if the banking system had a countercyclical capital buffer, it could use that capital to counteract the reduction in the minimum capital ratio resulting from balance sheet deterioration. By helping to maintain the solvency of the system, it would also minimize the reduction in bank credit.
But Basel II/III recommendations on regulatory capital go beyond the discussion of ratios and include guidelines for financial institutions to foster better risk management and for supervisors to monitor these practices (Pillar 2 of Basel II and III). An interesting factor in Chile is that in practice, a series of Basel guidelines are complied with, but not explicitly considered in the regulations. Two examples illustrate this statement. One example is the stress tests conducted by the banks, both at their own initiative and by request of the SBIF, and the stress analyses conducted by the Central Bank of Chile. These analyses, which are highly recommended by Basel II and III, are not explicitly stated in the regulations. The second example is that several banks (including large, medium and small banks), use internal rating models (the recommendations for the Basel II approach known as "internal ratings-based approach" [IRB]) for calculating expected losses 23 . In some cases, the models include elements recommended by the Basel Committee, as a response to SBIF regulations on classifying management and solvency, which encourage using risk management best practices. 24 However, explicit regulation is still pending for using and supervising the Basel II IRB approach for calculating capital.
The incorporation of Basel recommendations to Chilean regulations, some of which have already been (partially) implemented de facto, would enhance the transparency associated with Chilean banking's risk management, and thus bolster the soundness of the financial system. However, it is important to point out that these regulatory changes also involve challenges for supervisors, which will be discussed later in this paper.
What are the Potential Disadvantages of Applying Basel III in Chile?
Implementing the complex Basel II/III regulatory framework involves some major risks. The first is the potential cost faced by banking institutions that need to increase their capital levels to comply with the new regulation. This is the main concern expressed by banks in developed countries, which have argued that the costs of increasing regulatory capital may have adverse effects on bank loans and interest ratescharged. 25 -particularly on loans to small and medium enterprises whose risk levels are higher than those of large enterprises. When banking systems require significant increases in their capital holdings to comply with Basel III, there is understandably a need to conduct in-depth, detailed analyses on possible regulatory impact, and serious considerations on possible steps that should be implemented prior to adopting Basel III. The good news is that recent experience in Latin American countries that are applying Basel III (Mexico and Brazil) has found that this risk has not materialized. In fact, this potential disadvantage for a given country can only be assessed by analyzing concrete data from bank balance sheets that enable measurement of possible capital insufficiencies banks would face if Basel II was implemented. To this end, Section V provides a simple simulation exercise for the Chilean case.
A second potential problem is that implementing Basel III in Chile might increase already existing regulatory discrepancies between banks and non-financial institutions involved in credit activities. Banking regulations are currently not fully applied in terms of coverage and rigor to a series of entities, such as businesses, compensation funds and insurance companies that provide consumer and mortgage credit. 26 To the extent that Basel III implementation increases regulatory restrictions to banks, it may foster regulatory arbitrage, which would increase credit activities of other entities not subject to the same financial regulation. This would be an important risk to financial system stability.
In general, it is important to identify and control the possible emergence of new forms of destabilizing regulatory arbitrage that may result from greater and more complex regulations, of which Basel II and III are no exceptions. For example, internationally, the combination of (a) stricter banking regulations in developed countries after the global financial crisis 27 and (b) abundant international liquidity as a result of extremely low interest rates, has resulted in a re-composition of private sector external debt(financial and non-financial) in a series of emerging countries, including Brazil. While external financing through bank loans has declined, bond issuance in international capital markets has increased significantly, to the point that total private sector external financing in emerging countries was much higher for 2011-2013 than during the period prior to the global crisis. 28 One potential problem is that international experience shows that private sector debts are a contingency of the public sector and tend to materialize in the presence of adverse shocks. The lesson for Chilean bank regulators is the need to ensure that regulatory changes associated with Basel III are compatible with other regulations and policies existing in Chile.
Considering a future in which reforms to the General Banking Law (GBL) are contemplated, 29 there is an additional potential problem related to possible effects of changes in regulatory capital on Chilean banks operating internationally. The international competitiveness of these banks may be affected to the extent that (a) countries in which they operate have more relaxed capital requirements, and (b) the SBIF is empowered to supervise the financial conglomerate and require the same treatment of regulatory capital by local banks and their overseas affiliates. The solution to this lies in close coordination between regulators and supervisors in Chile and in countries hosting Chilean affiliates.
V. Challenges for Applying Basel III in Chile
As discussed above, one of the central topics for evaluating potential regulatory changes in Chilean legislation is to analyze how complicated and expensive it might be for banks and supervisors to implement the regulation. Although many questions arise from this subject, whose answers require in-depth analysis, most of this section concentrates on just one of them Based on available information, for the exercise presented in this paper, Chilean accounts are approximated to a concept of Tier 1 Capital by adding to basic capital the account minority 30 The exercise does not include a simulation for the 3% leverage ratio proposed by Basel III (Tier I Capital/Total Assets) because Chilean legislation already complies with it. Specifically, Chilean regulations state that the basic capital should not be less than 3% of the net total assets of required provisions. As will be discussed later, the basic capital in Chile fairly well approaches the Basel III concept of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital. 31 For a similar exercise for a group of countries in the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), see Galindo, Rojas-Suarez and del Valle (2011) 32 Data can be found at http://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb/servlet/InfoFinanciera?indice=4.1&idCategoria=547&tipocont=0. 33 Given the available information, the exercise can be replicated only at the end of each quarter because although the Consolidated Capital Adequacy has a monthly frequency, the SBIF report with the financial statements of financial institutions is published on the SBIF website at the end of each quarter. 34 SBIF, Recopilación Actualizada de Normas, capítulo 12-1: Patrimonio para Efectos Legales y Reglamentos (Updated Collection of Regulations, Chapter 12-1: Equity for Legal Effects and Regulations), http://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb/servlet/LeyNorma?indice=3.1.2 35In general terms, basic capital in Chilean regulations meets the conditions of Basel III Tier 1 common capital for two reasons: (a) the provision for minimum dividends is deducted, and (b) the Shareholders Meetings only meet once a year to determine the amount of dividend distribution above the minimum-i.e., it is not mandatory to distribute dividends beyond the minimum set by law.
interest (with the restrictions set by Chilean legislation) 36 and applying the deductions to regulatory capital established by the Chilean legislation (these deductions include "Goodwill" plus minority investments). 37 Under these assumptions, the first line in Table 5 shows that Tier 1 Capital according to current Chilean legislation would be about 13,179 billion pesos as of June 2014. Following Chilean legislation, RWAs only include Risk-Weighted Assets for Credit Risk (RWAc). 38 This results in a Tier 1 Capital/RWAc ratio of 10%.
Table 5: Chile -Capital adjustments according to the Basel III Agreement
In order to calculate what Tier 1 capital would be if Basel III recommendations were implemented, deductions suggested by the Basel Committee were applied. In the case of Chile, it is necessary to consider a deferred tax deduction. However, it is not clear what the amount subject to deduction is as Basel III states that it is possible to compensate this type of tax credit with liabilities for deferred taxes, as long as both items refer to taxes charged by the same fiscal authority and that the fiscal authorities authorize the compensation. In the face of this uncertainty, two scenarios were calculated. Scenario 1 allows this compensation, so only net deferred taxes are deducted. In Scenario 2, gross deferred taxes are deducted. As shown in Table 5 , Tier 1 capital estimated according to Basel III as a percentage of RWAc would be 9.03% under Scenario 1 and 8.5% under Scenario 2. In both scenarios, the value of the ratio is equal to or greater than the 8.5% value recommended by Basel III. 39 40 36 Chilean law establishes that the minority interest computable as part of the regulatory capital cannot be greater than 20% of the basic capital. 37 Basel III deducts Goodwill from the Tier 1 Capital and this deduction is accounted for by Chilean legislation.
38 Table 6 includes a simulation in which risk-weighted assets for market risk and for operational risk are added. 39 Except that Table 5 only includes risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the denominator of the ratio. 40 It is important to note that it is not known whether the minority interest included in Chilean regulatory capital accounting meets the conditions established by Basel III; so the value of Tier 1 capital might be overestimated. If so, the adjustment would be small because the minority capital allowed by Chilean law for calculating regulatory capital is less than 2.6% of Tier 1 Capital; i.e., if all the minority interest had to be deducted, the Tier 1 capital/RWAc ratio estimated according to Basel III would be 8.77% in Scenario 1 and 8.24% in Scenario 2. To calculate what Tier 2 Capital would be if Basel III recommendations were followed, we add the amount for subordinate bonds issued by banks that exceeds the limit allowed in Chilean regulations for calculating regulatory capital. 43 This is because Basel III allows the inclusion of the entire value of subordinate bonds which meet certain characteristics, and said characteristics match the requirements of Chilean legislation for the issuance of subordinate bonds. Specifically, Chilean regulations establish that banks can only issue subordinate bonds with "an average term not less than 5 years, without special guarantee" and "issuance conditions shall not include clauses which mean early payment of all or part of the bonds issued." 44
Upon making the relevant adjustment, Tier 2 Capital, according to Basel III criteria, would be equivalent to 4,804 billion pesos, i.e., 3.64% of the RWAc. 45
As shown in Table 5 , if Basel III criteria were followed, Total Capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Capital) would result in a Capital/RWAc ratio of 12.67% in Scenario 1 and 12.14% in Scenario 2. From this exercise (which is preliminary and limited to its assumptions) it is concluded that the reduction in regulatory capital as a percentage of RWAc that the Chilean banking system would undergo if Basel III were implemented would be moderate (0.79% under Scenario 1 and 1.32% under Scenario 2).
As mentioned above, Table 5 was developed under the assumption that RWA for calculating regulatory capital follow current regulations in Chile, which only include risk-weighted assets for credit risk (RWAc). However, RWA in Basel II and III also includes risk-weighted assets for market risk (RWAm) and for operational risk (RWAo). The value for RWAm is taken directly from SBIF data published on a monthly basis. 46 Given that current Chilean regulation does not include this amount in the denominator of the capital requirement ratio, its calculation is simply referential. The value for RWAo is not published periodically either by the SBIF or by the Central Bank of Chile, so it was approximated based on data published in the Financial Stability Report of the Central Bank of Chile for the second half in 2010. 47 Pointing out once again that the calculations are merely approximations and subject to information availability, Table 6 provides an estimate of RWA and its different components. According to this approximation, the total value of risk-weighted assets would be 147,785 billion pesos in June 2014. This value was used as denominator for calculating the capital/RWA ratios under Scenarios 1 and 2 described above. Table 6 show that if Basel III recommendations on capital were fully applied and without gradualness, i.e., not only by making the deductions on the capital calculation (the numerator in the ratio) but also by including the market and operational risks in the RWA calculation, the Chilean banking system, at aggregate level, would face a relatively moderate capital deficit to comply with the Tier 1 capital requirements. Under both scenarios, the Tier 1 capital ratio according to Basel III is lower than 8.5% − 8.05% under Scenario 1 and 7.58% under Scenario 2. 46 See: http://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb/servlet/InfoFinanciera?indice=4.1&idCategoria=547&tipocont=548. The SBIF states that estimated RWAm follows the Basel criteria, i.e., RWAm=12.5*Market Risk. 47 The reference data were taken from page 49 of Reporte de Estabilidad Financiera del Banco Central de Chile, segundo semestre del 2010 (Report on Financial Stability of the Central Bank of Chile, second semester 2010). That page shows the estimate of a capital requirement ratio which included not only the RWAc as set forth in current legislation but also the RWAm and RWAo. We used this ratio, SBIF data for RWAc and RWAm for June 2014 and basic algebra to estimate the figure for RWAo for June 2014 shown in Table 6 . However, under both scenarios, Chilean banking at an aggregate level would comply with Basel III total capital recommendations: under both scenarios, the capital ratios would be greater than 10.5%. This conclusion is consistent with a similar analysis by the SBIF reported by the International Monetary Fund (2013). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the analysis in this section was done for the banking system as a whole, and may therefore hide important differences between banks. Identifying these differences between banks is essential for designing an effective transition to Basel III.
Additional challenges to the implementation of Basel III in Chile
Chilean regulators and supervisors will face certain challenges associated with changes in regulatory capital. This subsection discusses two of them.
As discussed in Section IV, most banks are already using internal risk-rating models in their calculation of provisions for group portfolios, and some banks are using them for their internal estimates of economic capital. The SBIF is already continuously evaluating the quality of these models, which is an advantage for the implementation of some Basel III recommendations on capital. However, the SBIF may also face challenges because Chilean supervision would have to be fully capable of evaluating not only the quality of models applicable to group portfolios, but also the methodologies used by banks to evaluate the credit risk of their positions with regard to each borrower or counterpart. Given the increasing sophistication of the Chilean financial system, in the context of the high foreign bank participation it is recommendable to study the steps needed to bridge any gap existing between the competencies and capacities of Chilean supervision and those in developed countries.
A second challenge for authorities is establishing the schedule for implementing the new capital regulations. In 2012 and 2013, respectively, the schedules established in Mexico and Brazil hastened the implementation of minimum capital requirements (in relation to those proposed by Basel III). Nevertheless, Chile would not need to speed up the implementation process, especially because the current international financial and economic context is not conducive for economic growth in emerging countries, which could affect financial strength and solvency indicators in these countries, including Chile.
Moreover, the Chilean experience in the process for implementing the Basel recommendations regarding liquidity ratios provides lessons for the potential implementation of new capital requirements. For example, it is appropriate that Chilean regulators are proposing gradualness and a sufficiently long timeframe for implementing new liquidity regulations. It is also appropriate that collecting information on liquidity requirements be allowed for supervisory monitoring, but no public disclosure of this information during a period of proposal evaluation and calibration. These precautionary measures are essential to ensuring that the regulations are implemented effectively.
VI. Additional Considerations: Adapt, Rather Than Adopt, Some Basel III Recommendations on Capital?
The Basel Committee recognizes that some recommendations would have the desired effect if they were adapted to each country's specific context: this is reflected in the relatively high level of discretion that Basel III allows domestic supervisors for implementing the capital recommendations. The drafting of a bill in Chile aimed at Basel II/III and the regulations that will be developed based on it provide an opportunity to consider whether some recommendations of the international standard need adapting.
Although there are many areas which could be considered candidates for a process of adaptation of Basel III standards, particularly those related to credit risk-weighting used for calculating regulatory capital under the Basel II standardized approach, 48 the elements relevant to Chile can be identified comprehensively during the consultation process for the bill. For purely illustrative purposes, this section presents an example of possible adaptation of the Basel III recommendations regarding the countercyclical capital buffer.
Basel III recommends that authorities should monitor bank credit growth and other indicators to evaluate whether excessive risks are created in the financial system. According to this evaluation, the authorities will decide when to activate the countercyclical capital buffer with the aim of limiting excessive credit expansion, thus minimizing the probability of severe banking problems. Basel III recommends that the increases in countercyclical buffer capital (which varies from 0 to 2.5% of RWA) should be announced up to 12 months earlier to make it easier for banks to comply with the requirement, whereas the decision to reduce buffer levels should be made effective immediately. One major challenge for Chilean authorities is the development of soundness analysis to enable appropriate design of the countercyclical buffer. 49 In the document Guidance for National Authorities Operating the Countercyclical Buffer (2010), the Basel Committee suggests using the deviations of the credit/GDP ratio with regard to its trend (credit/GDP ratio gap) as the reference indicator for making decisions regarding when to activate and deactivate the countercyclical buffer. The choice of this indicator is based on 48 They highlight the criticism to using risk-rating agencies to rate banking assets according to risk levels in the Basel II standardized approach (despite the modifications added in Basel III). To situate the issue in the case of Chile, consider risk-weighting of government securities. In current legislation, the weighting given to government securities and credits guaranteed by the Chilean government is equal to 10%, because it is recognized that the risk of treasury debt in emerging countries is higher than in counties whose government securities remain liquid even in situations of high financial turbulence, e.g. US Treasury bonds). This distinction of risks between advanced and emerging countries is not considered in Basel II or III. If the standardized Basel II approach was adopted in Chile, said weighting would drop to zero because the rating by risk rating agencies would justify it. The relevant question for Chilean authorities and the banking industry is whether it is appropriate to follow this Basel II-III recommendation or if the progress already made in current legislation with regard to recognizing the risk of treasury obligations in an emerging country should be maintained. 49 The design of the countercyclical buffer requires the determination of thresholds for activating and deactivating the capital accumulation that forms that buffer. In order to prevent too much capital from accumulating unnecessarily, or there not being enough capital when it is needed, it is essential to conduct simulation exercises of scenarios to confirm the soundness of the thresholds selected.
wide-ranging literature that concludes that it is the variable proven most effective for providing early alert signals of financial disturbances.
However, as pointed out by Repullo and Saurina (2011) , even if this indicator has the characteristics of a leading indicator for banking problems, the credit/GDP ratio gap may not be the best reference indicator for activating the countercyclical capital buffer. In particular, it is not an adequate indicator if the correlation between the indicator and economic growth is negative. In that case, capital requirements tend to increase when GDP growth is low and to decrease when GDP growth is high, 50 i.e., the capital buffer behaves in a pro-cyclical manner regarding economic activity, which is precisely the opposite of what Basel III intends.
Why might there be a negative correlation between the credit/GDP ratio gap and economic growth? Repullo and Saurina (2011) argue that the main reason is from the possible (and frequently found) lag in credit behavior relative to the business cycle. In particular, during times of low economic growth, the credit/GDP ratio frequently remains at high levels as a result of higher demand from companies for credit lines to fund inventories.
Based on the above discussion, it is relevant and appropriate to estimate the correlation between the credit/GDP ratio gap and economic growth in Chile. This exercise may serve to guide the decisions of Chilean authorities regarding the implementation and design of the countercyclical capital buffer. Graph 3 shows that the correlation between these two variables is negative. 51 Although Chilean authorities will need to make a more precise estimate, the preliminary conclusion is that it would not be appropriate for Chile to use the credit/GDP ratio gap as the reference indicator for activating (or deactivating) the countercyclical capital buffer.
Graph 3: Chile -Credit/GDP gap and real GDP growth
Source: Central Bank of Chile, IFS Similar results have been found for Peru and Colombia, 52 but not for Brazil, confirming the need to consider options that satisfy the Basel III aims and also take national contexts into account.
What might alternatives to the countercyclical capital reference indicator be? Supervisory authorities in Peru are using the real GDP growth rate as a reference indicator for the countercyclical capital buffer. 53 Theoretically, Repullo and Saurina (2011) propose using the deviations of the real credit growth rate with regard to its trend, arguing that the probabilities of finding a positive correlation between real credit growth and economic growth are high, because the lag problem that appears in the credit/GDP ratio is eliminated. Graph 4 shows that this correlation is indeed highly positive in Chile. 52 Repullo and Saurina (2011) also found a negative correlation for a group of European countries. 53 See https://intranet1.sbs.gob.pe/IDXALL/FINANCIERO/DOC/RESOLUCION/PDF/8425-2011.R.PDF. The rules for activating and de-activating countercyclical capital in Peru are the same as the rule for cyclical provisions. The countercyclical capital buffer in Peru is activated when any of the following conditions is met: (a) average growth of real annualized GDP over the past 30 months goes from less than 5% to a level equal to or higher than 5%; (b) the growth of real annualized GDP over the past 30 months is already above 5% and average annualized growth for the past 12 months is 2% higher than the value recorded during the previous year, or (c) average growth of real annualized GDP over the past 30 months is already higher than 5% and the countercyclical rule has been de-activated in the past 18 months, at least. Thus, this exercise's preliminary conclusion is that it would be appropriate for Chilean authorities to consider alternative methods for implementing the countercyclical capital buffer. One alternative is using real credit growth as a reference indicator, and another is the Peruvian methodology. 54 More broadly, the exercise also suggests the need to evaluate other areas where Basel III capital recommendations are adapted to the particular features of the Chilean financial system.
VII. Conclusions
The analysis performed in this paper allows a series of conclusions to be drawn on the potential implementation of the Basel III recommendations on capital in Chile. The first conclusion is that it is highly relevant to consider applying the Basel III guidelines in Chile, which has one of the soundest financial systems in Latin America and has not undergone a banking crisis in over three decades. However, there are at least three reasons that warrant giving serious consideration to making changes to adjust bank capital regulations to the new standard: (a) the regulators of parent companies of foreign banks that operate in Chile are already implementing Basel III, which could create discrepancies in the regulatory 54 The argument of Peruvian authorities for choosing real GDP growth as a reference indicator is that Peru has a very low rate of bank penetration and that major growth in credit growth rate might not warrant activating a countercyclical buffer, because such a policy might slow healthy expansion of credit. Although Peru does indeed have one of the lowest credit/GDP ratios in the region (27% average for 2010-13), the argument has some weaknesses because according to empirical literature, what matters for financial problems is a very rapid expansion of credit and not the level from which said expansion begins. In any event, Chile is the country in the region with greatest financial depth and thus the argument for using the Peruvian rule, though worth considering, is not very strong.
The argument for using financial variables such as real credit growth is based on the observation worldwide that fluctuations in output are more frequent than fluctuations in financial cycles and can lead to serious financial problems. In that case, using the output growth rate could lead to unnecessary accumulation of countercyclical buffer. The validity of this argument for the case of Chile requires empirical analysis. requirements between Chilean domestic banking and foreign banking; (b) credit cycles in Chile are pronounced and evidence shows that there have been credit booms in recent decades, which have created strong subsequent credit contractions-the Basel III countercyclical capital component is a tool for preventing these booms; and (c) the macroeconomic, institutional and supervisory quality fundamentals in Chile ensure that the financial system could undergo regulatory changes without affecting stability.
A second conclusion is that implementing Basel III capital standard in Chile has the potential advantage of improving Chilean banking's international competitiveness because compliance with this standard is becoming internationally recognized as a sign of financial strength and good risk management. Given that the Latin American countries which are simultaneously partners and competitors of Chilean banking are rapidly implementing Basel III guidelines, it would be advantageous to Chile "not to be left behind." Specifically, the other three Pacific Alliance member countries (Colombia, Mexico and Peru) have already made significant progress in implementing Basel III. Moreover, Brazil, the only country in Latin America that, due to its level of financial sophistication, could potentially compete with Chile as a regional financial center, has already fully adopted the new capital standard.
To assess the potential problems and challenges that could result from implementing Basel III in Chile, a concrete analysis of bank balances, to measure possible capital insufficiencies that banks might face upon implementation, is needed. A simple preliminary simulation exercise performed in this paper allows these possible insufficiencies to be evaluated for the banking system as a whole. The conclusion of this exercise is that under alternative scenarios, Chilean banking as a whole would meet Basel III recommendations regarding total capital ratios (in relation to risk-weighted assets). In the two the scenarios considered, the capital ratios are greater than 10.5%. However, the banking system as a whole would have a capital deficit to comply with the Tier 1 capital ratio. Because this exercise was carried out for the banking system as a whole, the results may hide important differences between banks, thus, a more detailed analysis at the individual bank level is highly recommended.
An additional conclusion refers to the adequate design of the implementation schedule for the new capital standard. Although Mexico and Brazil hastened the implementation of minimum capital requirements relative to the schedule proposed by Basel III, it may not be recommendable for Chile to do the same in view of the fact that the current international economic and financial situation is becoming less favorable for emerging countries. This might affect financial strength and solvency indicators in these countries, including Chile. In addition, the Chilean experience in the process of implementing Basel recommendations regarding liquidity ratios may provide lessons for the possible implementation of the new capital standard. For example, it is appropriate that Chilean regulators are proposing gradualness and a sufficiently long timeframe for implementing new liquidity regulations. These precautionary measures may also be essential to ensure the effectiveness of regulatory changes for capital requirements.
Finally, it is suggested that a more detailed analysis is needed to determine which Basel III recommendations on capital should be adapted to the Chilean context. To illustrate, a quantitative exercise in this paper suggests that it would not be appropriate for Chile to use the reference indicator suggested by Basel III (the deviations of the credit/GDP ratio with regard to its trend) for activating (or deactivating) the countercyclical capital buffer. The preliminary result is that for Chile (and other countries in the region), using this indicator would contribute to the capital buffer behaving in a pro-cyclical manner relative to economic activity, which is precisely the opposite of what Basel III intends. To conclude, it would be appropriate for Chilean authorities to consider alternative methodologies for implementing countercyclical capital.
It is hoped that this paper will help support the consultation process among supervisors and banks for the potential implementation of the new Basel III recommendations on capital. As mentioned in the paper, a more detailed analysis at the individual bank level is needed in order to continue making progress towards more refined conclusions.
